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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) enables an 
immigrant to obtain a visa as a “special immigrant religious 
worker” if the immigrant meets certain statutory criteria, 
including that he has been “carrying on” religious work for at 
least the two years preceding the filing of the visa petition.  
This case presents the question whether a requirement 
imposed in the relevant regulation that this religious work 
have been carried on “in lawful immigration status” crosses 
the line from permissible statutory interpretation by the 
responsible agency to ultra vires regulation contrary to the 
clear intent of Congress.  None of our sister Courts of 
Appeals have yet weighed in on this issue, but the District 
Court here concluded that the regulation is ultra vires because 
it contradicts the plain language of the INA.  Shalom 
Pentecostal Church v. Beers, No. 11-4491, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 185091, at *19 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 2013).  For the 
reasons set forth below, we agree.  We therefore will affirm 
the District Court’s order as to the invalidity of the regulation 
but will reverse and remand for further fact-finding on the 
remaining visa criteria. 
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I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 A.  Alencar’s Visa Application 
 None of the material facts in this case are disputed.  
Appellee Carlos Alencar, a Brazilian national, travelled with 
his family to the United States on a B-2 nonimmigrant tourist 
visa in June 1995.  The visa authorized Alencar to stay in the 
United States until December 1995, but he has remained in 
the United States unlawfully since the visa expired.  Alencar 
was not authorized to work under the terms of his B-2 visa, 
nor did he otherwise obtain employment authorization.    
 Alencar has been seeking legal immigration status as a 
special immigrant religious worker since 1997, when he first 
petitioned for an I-360 visa petition, which would eventually 
qualify him to seek permanent residency status.  That petition 
and a second petition filed by Alencar in 2001 were both 
rejected by the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Service (CIS).  Nonetheless, Alencar began working as a 
senior pastor for the Shalom Pentecostal Church (the 
“Church”) in 1998 and continued in that capacity through the 
filing of this appeal.    
 The I-360 petition at issue here was filed by the 
Church on Alencar’s behalf in 2009.  CIS again denied the 
petition and, in this instance, did so on the sole ground that 
the Church had failed to establish, pursuant to newly 
promulgated 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(4) and (11) (the 
“Regulation”), that Alencar had been “performing full-time 
work in lawful immigration status as a religious worker for at 
least the two-year period immediately preceding the filing of 
the petition.”  (App. 90 (emphasis added).)  The CIS 
Administrative Appeals Office dismissed the Church’s 
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appeal, concluding, consistent with the Regulation, that 
Alencar’s “religious employment in the United States during 
the qualifying period was not authorized under United States 
immigration law.”  (App. 66.) 
 In 2011, Alencar and the Church filed a complaint in 
the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey, challenging the denial of the I-360 petition on several 
grounds, including that the Regulation was ultra vires to the 
INA.1  The District Court denied the Government’s motion to 
dismiss and subsequently granted plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment, invalidating the Regulation on the 
grounds that the statutory language was unambiguous and 
that the Regulation’s addition of the “lawful status” 
requirement was inconsistent with the statutory scheme.2  The 
District Court further held that any remand would be futile 
and ordered CIS to grant Alencar’s I-360 petition.   
                                              
1  Alencar and the Church also argued below that the 
Regulation violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(42 U.S.C. § 2000bb) and the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.  The 
District Court dismissed these claims, and Appellees have not 
challenged those rulings on appeal. 
 
2  The majority of the district courts to have considered 
this question have come to the same conclusion.  See 
Congregation of the Passion v. Johnson, No. 13-2275, 2015 
WL 518284, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2015); Shia Ass’n of Bay 
Area v. United States, 849 F. Supp. 2d 916 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  
But see Islamic & Educ. Ctr. Ezan of Greater Des Moines v. 
Napolitano, 826 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (S.D. Iowa 2011). 
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 B.  The Visa Petition Process  
 The INA provides for preference in the issuance of 
visas to five categories of workers: (1) priority workers, (2) 
aliens with advanced degrees or of exceptional ability, (3) 
skilled workers and professionals, (4) special immigrants, 
including religious workers, and (5) foreign investors.  8 
U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)-(5).  The subcategory at issue in this 
case—the special immigrant religious worker program—
permits ministers and nonminister religious workers to 
immigrate in legal status to the United States to perform 
religious work.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C).  In order to 
become a legal permanent resident (LPR) through the special 
immigrant religious worker program, an alien or his 
prospective employer must complete two steps.  First, the 
applicant must successfully petition CIS for an I-360 visa.  8 
C.F.R. § 204.5(a), (c), (m)(6).  If granted that visa, the alien 
may apply to the Attorney General for permanent adjustment 
of status.  8 U.S.C. § 1255.3   
 This case focuses on the first step of this process.  The 
INA requires that, in order to qualify for an I-360 visa as a 
special immigrant religious worker, the immigrant must meet 
three criteria: (1) membership in a religious denomination 
                                              
3  At the second step of this process, an alien with an 
approved visa petition who is already in the United States 
may seek adjustment to LPR status, subject to a variety of 
restrictions and the Attorney General’s discretion.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255(a).  Alternatively, if abroad, an alien may apply for an 
immigrant visa from the local American consulate.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(n). 
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with a bona fide nonprofit religious organization in the United 
States for two years immediately preceding the petition, (2) 
intent to enter the United States or change status within the 
United States solely for the purpose of working as a minister 
or in another religious vocation, and (3) the “carrying on” of 
such religious work continuously for at least the two years 
before applying.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C)(i)-(iii).4 
                                              
4  In full, this section of the INA provides: 
 
 The term “special immigrant” means— 
 . . .  
(C) an immigrant, and the immigrant’s spouse and 
children if accompanying or following to join the 
immigrant, who— 
(i) for at least 2 years immediately preceding 
the time of application for admission, has been 
a member of a religious denomination having a 
bona fide nonprofit, religious organization in 
the United States; 
(ii) seeks to enter the United States— 
(I) solely for the purpose of carrying on 
the vocation of a minister of that 
religious denomination, 
(II) before September 30, 2015, in order 
to work for the organization at the 
request of the organization in a 
professional capacity in a religious 
vocation or occupation, or 
(III) before September 30, 2015, in order 
to work for the organization . . . at the 
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 As it is authorized to do under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3), 
CIS has promulgated regulations elaborating on these 
statutory qualifications.  Under the regulations, the visa 
petition procedure begins when either an alien or a person on 
the alien’s behalf applies for an I-360 visa.  That visa, if 
granted by CIS, classifies an alien as a special immigrant 
religious worker.  The filer must present evidence that the 
alien meets the statutory requirements as expounded by the 
regulations.  For example, while the statute requires that the 
alien seek to enter the United States “solely for the purpose of 
carrying on the vocation of a minister,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(C)(ii)(I), the regulations specify that the 
intended religious work be both full time and compensated.  8 
C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(2). 
 In 2008, CIS amended 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m) to require 
that an alien have worked “either abroad or in lawful 
immigration status in the United States, and . . . continuously 
for at least the two-year period immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition” to be eligible for classification as a 
special immigrant religious worker.  8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(4) 
(emphasis added).  The amendments also added that 
“[q]ualifying prior experience . . . if acquired in the United 
States, must have been authorized under United States 
                                                                                                     
request of the organization in a religious 
vocation or occupation; and  
(iii) has been carrying on such vocation, 
professional work, or other work continuously 
for at least the 2-year period described in clause 
(i). 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C). 
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immigration law.”  8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(11).  The Regulation 
thus disqualifies applicants like Alencar who did “carry on” 
otherwise qualifying religious work during the two years 
before they filed a visa application but did so without lawful 
status.   
II.   Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The Government filed a timely notice of appeal on 
November 13, 2013.  The District Court had jurisdiction 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA), and we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the legal conclusions related to 
standing de novo.  Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 
725 F.3d 406, 414 (3d Cir. 2013).  We apply de novo review 
to the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in a case 
brought under the APA.  Cyberworld Enter. Techs., Inc. v. 
Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 195 (3d Cir. 2010).    
III.   Discussion 
 The Government raises two issues on appeal.  First, it 
contends that Alencar and the Church lack standing to 
challenge the denial of the I-360 petition.  Specifically, the 
Government contests: (1) the constitutional standing of both 
Alencar and the Church, (2) Alencar’s standing under CIS 
regulation 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B), and (3) Alencar’s 
right to sue under the INA.  Second, the Government argues 
that the District Court erred in ruling that the Regulation is 
ultra vires.  We address these issues in turn.  
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 A.  Standing   
  1.  Constitutional Standing 
  Article III of the Constitution requires that a plaintiff 
establish standing in order for his case to be justiciable.  
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992).  
Constitutional standing has three elements: injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability.  Id. at 560-61.  Here, the 
Government challenges only the third.  For an injury to be 
redressable, the plaintiff must show that it is “likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”  Id. at 561 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  If the plaintiff is the 
object of government action, “there is ordinarily little 
question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and 
that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress 
it.”  Id. at 561-62.   
 The Government asserts that no matter the result of 
this appeal, Alencar will not be eligible for adjustment to LPR 
status for at least ten years, so that any victory in the current 
proceeding will be “pyrrhic.”  (Appellants’ Br. 17 (citing 
App. 36).)  Even if an I-360 visa is granted, the Government 
points out, an alien is statutorily ineligible to adjust status 
from within the United States if he worked in unlawful 
immigration status for more than 180 days.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255(c)(2), (k)(2).  But an alien who seeks to adjust status 
from outside the United States and was present unlawfully in 
the United States for one year or more is inadmissible to the 
United States for ten years from his date of departure.  8 
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II); 1201(g)(1).  Alencar worked 
in unlawful immigration status for more than 180 days and 
has been present unlawfully in the United States for more 
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than one year.  Hence, he will be ineligible for adjustment of 
status for at least ten years.   
 This syllogism, however valid, does not bear on the 
question of Alencar’s standing to challenge the denial of his 
I-360 petition on the basis of the legality of the Regulation.  
As a threshold matter, the Government’s contention that relief 
must be immediate to satisfy constitutional standing finds no 
support in our precedent.  Rather, as the Supreme Court made 
clear in Lujan, redressability hinges on the availability and 
likelihood of relief, rather than the immediacy of relief.  See 
504 U.S. at 561-62.  Indeed, a requirement of immediate 
redressability would be particularly inappropriate in the 
immigration context, where there is frequently a lengthy 
delay between a favorable decision and the availability of 
relief.  See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 
2199 (2014).  
 In any event, Alencar is seeking a visa at this point, not 
permanent adjustment of status.  While obtaining a visa is a 
prerequisite to applying for LPR status, the INA makes clear 
that the visa petition process and the adjustment of status 
process are distinct.  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1153, with 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255; see Matter of O-----, 8 I & N Dec. 295, 297 (BIA 
1959) (“The visa petition procedure is concerned merely with 
the question of status.  It does not concern itself with 
substantive questions of inadmissibility . . . .”).  Even the 
Government acknowledges that “the INA sets forth distinct 
criteria for applicants qualifying as special immigrant 
religious workers (immigrant visa) and for those seeking to 
adjust status (adjustment of status).”  (Appellants’ Br. 31.) 
 We are guided by the Supreme Court’s approach in 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, where the Court 
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analyzed redressability in the context of multi-part 
proceedings based on the availability of relief at a given step, 
rather than the likelihood of achieving the ultimate goal.  See 
561 U.S. 139, 151-53 (2010) (holding that farmers had 
standing to challenge restrictions on an agency’s ability to 
deregulate a genetically-engineered product even though their 
ultimate goal of deregulation could not be achieved without 
further agency action).  In Alencar’s case, that step is the 
petition for an I-360 visa.  If Alencar satisfies § 1101(a)(27)’s 
criteria, the statute provides in mandatory terms that a visa 
“shall be made available,” subject to specified numerical 
limits.  8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4).  Thus, as the Sixth Circuit 
aptly observed in Patel v. USCIS, when an alien’s visa 
petition is denied, he has “lost a significant opportunity to 
receive an immigrant visa” and “that lost opportunity is itself 
a concrete injury.”  732 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Abboud v. INS, 140 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1998)).   
 The Government’s insistence that we determine at the 
visa petition stage the redressability of a different and 
potential injury, i.e., Alencar’s prospects for eventual 
adjustment of status, would turn the INA’s carefully 
considered statutory scheme on its head.  Congress has 
provided for separate and sequential processes to obtain an I-
360 visa and to apply for adjustment of status.  Compare 8 
U.S.C. § 1153, with 8 U.S.C. § 1255.  At the second stage, 
CIS—not the federal courts—ordinarily adjudicates an 
application for adjustment of status in the first instance, 8 
C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1), and Congress has expressly excluded 
from judicial review the Attorney General’s discretionary 
decision regarding final adjustment of status.  8 U.S.C. 
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§§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), 1255(a).5  It would hardly make sense, 
then, to base an alien’s standing at the first stage on a court’s 
prognostication about that Executive Branch decision at the 
second.   
 Instead, we hold that the injury at that first stage is 
redressable by judicial action, and Appellees therefore have 
constitutional standing to challenge the denial of the I-360 
petition. 
  2.  Regulatory Standing 
 The Government contends that Alencar cannot 
proceed, even if he has Article III standing, because a CIS 
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B), authorizes an 
administrative appeal only by an “affected party,” which is 
defined as “the person or entity with legal standing in a 
proceeding,” and which “does not include the beneficiary of a 
petition.”  8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B).  Courts have relied 
on this regulation to uphold agency decisions dismissing visa 
beneficiaries for lack of standing in the context of 
administrative proceedings.  See, e.g., Echevarria v. Keisler, 
505 F.3d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 2007); Kale v. INS, 37 F. App’x 90 
(5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision).   
 We cannot agree that this regulation bars Alencar’s 
claim here.  Even assuming that it applies outside the context 
                                              
5  If an alien has been placed in deportation or removal 
proceedings, the Immigration Judge hearing the proceeding 
has exclusive jurisdiction over the application for adjustment 
of status, subject to certain exceptions.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1245.2(a)(1).   
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of administrative proceedings, this regulation must be read in 
tandem with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(c).  As the government points 
out, § 204.5(c) provides that, for most of the employment-
based visa categories, only the “employer” has standing to 
file a petition, rendering the alien the “beneficiary” and, 
consistent with the premise of the Government’s argument, 
not an “affected party” for purposes of standing on 
administrative appeal.6  The Government overlooks, however, 
the specific carve-out within § 204.5(c), which provides that, 
for special immigrant religious workers, “the alien, or any 
person in the alien’s behalf” has standing to file.  For this 
category of visa petitioner, the alien is not merely a 
“beneficiary,” but instead, either directly or through someone 
on his behalf, has legal standing.  Thus, contrary to the 
Government’s position, the “affected party” authorized to 
undertake an administrative appeal, even under CIS 
regulations, includes the special immigrant religious worker 
himself.  
  3.  The Zone-of-Interests Test 
 Even where standing is otherwise satisfied, an 
aggrieved party may be precluded from pursuing relief if the 
interest it seeks to vindicate falls outside the “zone of 
                                              
6  In any event, the cases relied upon by the Government 
appear limited to the administrative agency context, leading 
some courts to hold that § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B) only governs 
administrative proceedings and does not apply to standing in 
federal court at all.  See, e.g., Ore v. Clinton, 675 F. Supp. 2d 
217, 223 (D. Mass. 2009); Maramjaya v. USCIS, No. 06-
2158, 2008 WL 9398947, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2008).   
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interests” protected by the statute invoked.  Lexmark Int’l, 
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 
1386-89 (2014).  The Government argues that Alencar lacks 
this “zone of interest” or “prudential standing,”7 baldly 
asserting that the INA’s “primary purpose” is “to protect 
American workers, while providing employers with limited 
access to foreign labor, only when absolutely necessary,” and 
therefore “aliens do not fall within any interest protected by 
the statute.”  (Appellants’ Reply Br. 4-5 (internal citations 
omitted).)  However, the zone-of-interests test for actions 
under the APA is “not especially demanding,” foreclosing 
suit “only when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally 
related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the 
statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress 
authorized the plaintiff to sue.”  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389 
(quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi 
Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012)). 
 The text of the INA leaves no doubt that the interests 
of employment-based visa petition applicants, and special 
immigrant religious workers in particular, are directly related 
                                              
7  The Supreme Court has criticized the use of 
“prudential standing” to describe this doctrine because the 
question of whether a plaintiff has a cause of action under a 
statute hinges on whether Congress has granted the plaintiff a 
cause of action, rather than whether courts think it should 
have done so.  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386-88 (describing the 
phrase “prudential standing” as “misleading”); see also Ass’n 
of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 675-76 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring) (stating “‘prudential 
standing’ is a misnomer”).  Therefore, erstwhile “prudential 
standing” is referred to here as the “zone-of-interests test.”  
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to the purposes of the INA.  The statute specifies the five 
categories of workers who receive preferential treatment in 
the visa process.  8 U.S.C. § 1153(b).  For special immigrant 
religious workers, it provides visas to the aliens themselves, 
rather than to their employers, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), and it 
contains an exception to the general disqualification for 
unlawful work status, so that these workers may still seek 
permanent residence as long as they have worked no more 
than 180 days unlawfully.  8 U.S.C. § 1255(k).  Further, while 
other employment-based visa applicants require a 
certification from the Department of Labor that no qualified 
Americans are available for the job, religious workers need 
only show that they have the requisite qualifications.  
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(C) and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(5)(A) with 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4).      
 In sum, Congress has taken affirmative steps in the 
INA to enable qualified foreign workers to provide services to 
religious organizations within the United States.   See Patel, 
732 F.3d at 636-37 (collecting authority); H.R. Rep. 101-
723(I) (1990); see also Br. of Amicus Curiae American 
Immigration Lawyers Association at 3.  We therefore reject 
the proposition that Alencar’s interests “are so marginally 
related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the 
statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress 
intended to permit the suit.”  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389 
(quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish, 132 S. Ct. at 2210). 
  B.  Validity of the Regulation 
   In addressing the validity of the Regulation, we apply 
the two-step analysis articulated by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  If Congress has directly and clearly spoken to the 
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question at issue, our Chevron analysis is complete at step 
one, and Congress’s unambiguous intent controls.  Id. at 842-
43.  However, if the statute is “silent or ambiguous,” or “[i]f 
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,” we 
proceed to the second step and determine whether the 
agency’s construction of the statute is reasonable.  Id. at 843. 
 In the first step of the Chevron analysis, we carefully 
scrutinize the plain text of the statute and apply traditional 
tools of statutory construction.  Bautista v. Att’y Gen., 744 
F.3d 54, 58-68 (3d Cir. 2014).  Mindful of the Supreme 
Court’s mandate that “[a] court must . . . interpret the statute 
as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if 
possible, all parts into an harmonious whole,” FDA v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted), we also may 
consider the broader statutory context and examine other 
parts of the governing statute to determine if the statutory 
language is silent or ambiguous.  See, e.g., Scialabba, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2204-05 (2014).   
 Here, the statute defines a special immigrant religious 
worker as an “immigrant” who has been “carrying on such 
vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for at 
least the 2-year period” preceding the application.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(C)(iii).  The term “immigrant”—defined by the 
INA, with certain exceptions, as “every alien”—by its plain 
terms includes aliens in both legal and illegal immigration 
status.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). 
 Because the term “carrying on” is not defined by the 
INA, we look to its ordinary meaning.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “carry on trade or business” as “to 
conduct, prosecute or continue a particular avocation or 
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business as a continuous operation or permanent occupation.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed. 1991).  Similarly, other 
dictionaries define “carry on” as “to manage” or “to conduct.”  
OED Online (December 2014), available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/28252; The American 
Heritage Dictionary 286 (4th ed. 2009); Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 344 (1993).  None of these 
definitions includes a requirement of lawfulness of the action 
or lawful status of the actor.   
 Moreover, a court should interpret a statute so as to 
“give effect to every word of a statute wherever possible.”  
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 (2004).  The Regulation’s 
requirement that qualifying work under § 1101(a)(27)(C)(iii) 
be “in lawful immigration status” would render another 
section of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(k)(2), largely, if not 
entirely, superfluous.  That is, in providing that a specified 
number of days of unauthorized work will not disqualify 
special immigrant religious workers from applying for 
permanent resident status, § 1255(k)(2) necessarily assumes 
that some such workers will have engaged in prior 
unauthorized employment.  Under the Regulation, on the 
other hand, a special immigrant religious worker could not 
obtain an I-360 visa—a prerequisite to applying for 
adjustment of status under § 1255(k)—if that worker had 
engaged in even a single day of unauthorized work during the 
two years preceding such worker’s I-360 visa petition.  The 
Regulation, in effect, would make § 1255(k)(2)’s exemption 
for unauthorized work meaningless in most circumstances.8   
                                              
8  While both sections could still have force in the 
situation where a petitioner worked in unlawful status for less 
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 Furthermore, in Russello v. United States, the Supreme 
Court observed that “[w]here Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it from another, 
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”  464 U.S. 
16, 23 (1983).  Section 1101(a)(27)(C)(iii) states that an alien 
must “carry on” his religious work “continuously” but makes 
no mention of “lawfully.”  Elsewhere within §§ 1101 and 
1153, in contrast, Congress specified no less than six times 
when it intended to require lawful status as a prerequisite to 
the grant of certain status or relief.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(6) 
(defining a “border crossing identification card” as a 
document that can be issued only to an alien who is “lawfully 
admitted” for permanent residence); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(A) (creating a category of special immigrants 
for immigrants “lawfully admitted” for permanent residence 
who are returning from a temporary visit abroad); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(i)(2) (permitting aliens who are the victims of severe 
human trafficking to engage in employment during the period 
they are in “lawful temporary resident status”); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153(a)(2)(A), (B) (alloting visas to the spouses, children, 
and unmarried sons and daughters of aliens “lawfully 
admitted” for permanent residence); 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) 
                                                                                                     
than 180 days and then, during the two years immediately 
prior to filing the I-360 visa petition, worked legally in the 
United States or worked abroad, the Government cannot 
negate the canon against superfluity merely by pointing out 
that a theoretical exception exists.  See Duncan v. Walker, 
533 U.S. 167, 174-75 (2001) (applying the canon against 
superfluity where a construction of the statute would render a 
word insignificant but not wholly superfluous).   
 
 20 
 
(making visas available for qualified immigrant entrepreneurs 
whose businesses will create full time employment for, 
among others, aliens “lawfully admitted” for permanent 
residence or “lawfully authorized” to be employed in the 
United States). 
 Yet there can be no doubt Congress was well aware 
that special immigrant religious workers may have worked 
illegally before applying for legal status:  An alien seeking 
permanent adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255, for 
example, generally is ineligible if he has “continue[d] in or 
accept[ed] unauthorized employment prior to filing an 
application for adjustment of status,” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2), 
or “was employed while the alien was an unauthorized alien,” 
8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(8).  For special immigrant religious 
workers who are present in the United States pursuant to 
lawful admission at the time of the application, however, the 
INA specifically carves out an exception to allow for 
adjustment of status—even if the alien engaged in 
unauthorized employment—so long as that unauthorized 
employment did not exceed 180 days in the aggregate.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1255(k)(2).  Against this backdrop, Congress’s 
decision to specify in § 1101(a)(27)(C)(iii) that immigrants 
carry on their religious work “continuously,” but not 
“lawfully,” is particularly significant.     
 We are unswayed by the line of decisions from the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit declining to apply 
Russello in the administrative agency context and observing 
that “a congressional mandate in one section and silence in 
another” may simply reflect a decision “to leave the question 
to agency discretion.”  Catawba Cnty., N.C. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 
20, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Cheney R. Co. v. ICC, 902 
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F.2d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).  We have not adopted this 
reasoning, and, to the contrary, we have concluded that “we 
must read the statute as written,” giving meaning to 
distinctions between statutory provisions, rather than rely on 
implicit assumptions of intent.  Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 
479, 486 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 Section 1255(k)(2) also puts to rest the Government’s 
arguments that § 1101(a)(27)(C)(iii) must be read in 
connection with the statutory ban on employers hiring 
unauthorized aliens and that the overall structure and purpose 
of the INA require lawful work absent an explicit exception.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)-(b).  Indeed, the argument proves too 
much, for Congress carved out just such an exception for the 
adjustment of status of special immigrant religious workers 
who engaged in unauthorized employment for an aggregate 
period of up to 180 days and otherwise satisfy § 1255(k).  8 
U.S.C. § 1255(k)(2).   
 Nor are we persuaded that, when Congress directed 
CIS to issue regulations specific to fraud in the special 
immigrant nonminister religious worker program (the 
“Nonminister Program”), it thereby acknowledged ambiguity 
in the work qualifications for ministers.  Special Immigrant 
Nonminister Religious Worker Program Act, Pub. L. No. 
110-391, 122 Stat. 4193 (2008); see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(C)(ii)(II), (III).  The Government submits that 
CIS adopted the Regulation as part of an agency rule intended 
to improve its “ability to detect and deter fraud,” and that the 
Regulation therefore necessarily was authorized by Congress.  
See Special Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Religious Workers, 
73 Fed. Reg. 72,276-01 (November 26, 2008).  Some parts of 
this rule were clearly designed to address fraud in the 
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administration of the program, such as the provision 
authorizing CIS to perform an on-site inspection of a 
petitioning religious organization, presumably to confirm, 
where relevant, that the alien is actually carrying on the 
specified religious work, as well as to ascertain the 
organization’s bona fides.  See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(12).  
That purpose is not apparent, however, in a requirement that 
such work, actually having been performed, was performed 
while the alien was in a particular immigration status.  Nor 
could that requirement, to the extent it is imposed on 
ministers, conceivably be aimed at fraud in the Nonminister 
Program.   
 The Government also argues that Congress indicated 
its acquiescence to the Regulation by reauthorizing the 
Nonminister Program four times since DHS adopted the 
Regulation.9  However, the canon of ratification, i.e., that 
“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative . . . 
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation 
when it re-enacts a statute without change,” Lorillard v. Pons, 
434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978), has little probative value where, as 
here, what is re-enacted is a different subsection of the 
statute.  See Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 
770 n.4 (2004).  It has even less bearing when it is 
                                              
9  See Reauthorization of EB-5 Regional Center 
Program, Pub. L. No. 112-176 § 3, 126 Stat. 1325 (2012); 
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-83 § 568(a)(1), 123 Stat. 2142 (2009); 
Legislative Branch Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 111-68 § 133, 
123 Stat. 2023 (2009); Special Immigrant Nonminister 
Religious Worker Program, Pub. L. No. 111-9 § 1, 123 Stat. 
989 (2009).   
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contradicted by clear and unambiguous evidence of 
Congress’s intent, reflected here in the plain language of 
§ 1101(a)(27)(C)(iii).  
 In sum, by its plain terms and consistent with Russello 
and applicable canons of statutory construction, the INA 
authorizes an alien who engaged in religious work 
continuously for the two years preceding the visa application 
and who meets the other statutory criteria to qualify for an I-
360 visa as a special immigrant religious worker.  As the 
statute is clear and unambiguous and the Regulation is 
inconsistent with the statute, the Regulation is ultra vires and 
we do not reach the second step of the Chevron analysis.   
IV.   Remedy  
 Having struck down the Regulation, the District Court 
concluded that remand would be futile and ordered CIS to 
grant the petition because it had offered no alternative ground 
for denial of Alencar’s petition.  Given the outcome dictated 
by the Regulation, however, CIS had no occasion to consider 
whether Alencar meets the other requirements for the special 
immigrant religious worker program.  When further fact-
finding is necessary to resolve an issue, a court of appeals “is 
not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into 
the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions 
based on such an inquiry.”  INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 
(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. 
Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)).  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the order granting the petition and will remand to the 
District Court with instructions to remand to the agency to 
address in the first instance whether Alencar satisfies 
§ 1101(a)(27)(C)’s remaining criteria.   
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* * * 
 For these reasons, we will affirm that portion of the 
District Court’s order granting summary judgment and 
striking 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.5(m)(4) and (11) as ultra vires, will 
reverse the portion granting Alencar’s petition, and will 
remand to the District Court for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.   
